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ABSTRACT. The objective of this paper is to perform a first experiment of quantitative as-
sessment on changes in allocation mechanisms and in their underlying delegation models, 
using the quantitative information and the descriptions of national funding systems pro-
duced in the PRIME project funding activity. Delegation has been explored through 
changes in instrument portfolios and in evaluation modes, as proofs of an evolution in re-
search governance. Some common trends can be identified: the reinforcing of both priority 
setting and peer review processes. The general result of our analysis is that some change in 
delegation modes took place, but there is not a simple transition from one delegation re-
gime to another, while a “contract” delegation model (the NPM reform) is not detectable 
through project funding analysis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
he aim of the paper is to give an empiri-
cal basis to the analysis of changes in the 
Government R&D funding allocation 
policy, using in a comparative way indicators on 
project funding1: we look at the evolution of 
R/D project funding along thirty years, since 
70’s to to-day’s, in four countries, i.e. Italy, 
Switzerland, Austria and Norway. Countries 
have been chosen on the basis of data availabil-
ity, but their institutional and historical variety 
allows us to get interesting results. The theoreti-
cal basis for analysing changes in the Govern-
ment funding allocation is the distinction of dif-
ferent delegation modes between State and the 
scientific community  over time (see D. Brown, 
2003), including different instruments and 
changes in the R/D project selection and evalua-
tion modes. The beneficiaries of R/D project 
funding are both private and public agents, but 
the theoretical frame we refer to has been devel-
oped in relation to the scientific environment 
and its transformations. The general assumption 
we tested is that in the long run the relevance of 
Government R/D project funding grows up in 
accordance with a change in the relation be-
tween Government and scientific institutions, 
from a trust based mode to “directed” funding. 
According to D. Brown this “directed” funding 
or incentive based delegation more recently 
(since 90’s) evolved in two directions: a “nested 
delegation”, i.e. the embedment of the incentive 
mode into a contract delegation between the 
State and the scientific institutions and/or a sort 
of delegation to networks, i.e. the support to the 
scientific community for self organising net-
works of cooperation with the user systems.  
Our empirical test, based on types of instru-
ments and types of process of selection and 
evaluation of R/D projects, cannot fully control 
for the institutional change (the NMP reform), 
which should modify the authority relation be-
tween policy makers and scientific institutions, 
therefore we have to be more cautious in dealing 
with these last changes. We mainly refer to free 
grants and investigator initiated projects, “di-
                                                                    
1 These indicators were developed by the authors and 
other partners for the ENIP project within the European 
PRIME network of excellence. 
rected” or top-down programmes and projects, 
and R/D networks and we use the combination 
of types of instruments with the selection and 
evaluation procedures for understanding the 
Government allocation policy evolution. The 
result of our analysis shows that the trust-based 
mode, where external criteria (for priorities or 
performance) don’t play a relevant role in the 
allocation process, didn’t disappear, even if in 
some country it has been strongly reappraised. It 
characterises with a more or less large share the 
portfolio of public R/D project funding instru-
ments and the selection/evaluation procedures. 
In countries where the scientific intermediary 
body has maintained its strength, such as Swit-
zerland or Austria, the trust-based relations have 
kept an important role also within an on going 
change of the scientific institutional environ-
ment.  
The organization of the paper is the 
following: the first paragraph deals with the 
presentation of the theoretical basis of the 
analysis of the evolution of the funding 
allocation policy. The second paragraph deals 
with the data and methodology. The third 
paragraph shows the main changes in the types 
of instruments used for the R&D funding 
allocation; the fourth paragraph develops the 
analysis of the R/D project evaluation processes 
by country; finally there is a discussion and 
conclusion. 
1. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Funding policies evolution can be analysed on 
the basis of a conceptualisation, i.e. in terms of 
delegation modes, proposed for studying science 
policy and the implicit paradox faced by policy 
makers of matching two potentially conflicting 
issues: “to guarantee maximum welfare benefits, 
without violating the independence of scientists 
and their organization ”(Braun, 2003)”. Accord-
ing to Braun (Braun, 2006), in research policy 
the interactions between policy makers and sci-
entific community can be analysed on the basis 
of two types of relationship: trust and delega-
tion. Some commonalities can be detected be-
tween the two, namely: 
− both are social structures, that derive from de-
cisions under risk taken by policy makers; 
T 
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− both entail resources invested on the base of 
an hope and expectation about other actors’ 
behaviour; 
− both face uncertainty about the future and use 
some control mechanisms. 
 
Some basic differences can be detected: 
delegation2 is an authority relation, which use 
some type of contract for defining the discretion 
space, while trust is not enforceable by law and 
the risk is “incorporated into the decision of 
whether or not to engage in the action” (Braun, 
2006). 
Braun puts into evidence four options 
available to policy makers for reducing the risk 
of the research investment (adverse selection 
and moral hazard risk)3 and finally for better 
integrating scientific world with the other 
worlds: to find a balance between conflicting 
interests, by creating consensus and interaction 
spaces (one example is the creation of new 
institutions, such as public-private networks), 
changing career patterns (reputation and career 
mechanisms), using intermediaries of trust (peer 
review, where scientific experts are chosen as 
adviser for the principal, and research 
institutions which settle procedural requirements 
for addressing the scientists’ behaviour), and 
funding agencies, where an explicit delegation is 
settled out and where the higher is the 
uncertainty about the preferences, objectives and 
outcomes (like in basic research for instance) 
the higher is the autonomy given to the funding 
agency4. These different options have been 
introduced in different periods of time and 
sometimes the last ones co-exist with the older 
ones.  
                                                                    
2 The relation between State and scientists can be 
seen as a relation of delegation when policy makers ask 
the agent of doing something that they cannot do by 
themselves for lack of capabilities and knowledge. The 
principal can hardly observe what the agent does, while 
the last one has interest to reduce its effort. 
3 The first is related to the choice of the scientists and 
the second to the possibility that scientists do their best 
for answering to the tasks delegated to them. 
4 The characteristics of delegation are determined by: 
a) the amount of discretion policy makers grant to 
funding agencies, b) the procedures of control they have 
(i.e. procedural requirements like ex-ante evaluation), c) 
how funding agencies position themselves between the 
principal and the agents, and the dynamics of this 
positioning. 
Science policy originally was a matter for the 
scientists and their institutions, which used an 
internal price or value signals based on peer 
review and publications, while State allocated 
funds to free projects (and granted funds to the 
research institutions) without external conditions. 
Later on an allocation based on external price 
signals, given by priorities and specific research 
objectives, defined by the political system, 
joined the first mode. Control is still based on 
the peer review system, with some special 
conditions attached. This is, for instance, the 
case of a relevant bundle of scientific 
programmes in Italy (called “Finalised 
projects”). These were resources (programme 
funding) added to the pre-existing un-
conditioned R/D funds. As Brown underlines 
this incentive mode was not strongly 
constraining and scientists were free of choosing 
under which kind of funding to work. Moreover, 
as underlined by a large literature, since the 
scientific career and the institutional 
environment were unchanged, working within 
research programmes could represent a cost for 
scientists in terms of time and outcome.   
Since the half of ‘70s, but in some countries 
later, the presence of an “austerity period” 
modified the situation: the causes were first of 
all economic (oil crisis), but some policy makers 
used them strategically for re-orienting the 
scientific activities and other policy makers 
followed. It has been in fact a rather general 
political change5. The relation between State 
and scientific community was unchanged, but 
the undirected and unconditioned funds were 
reduced and the political price signals 
reinforced. As Brown points out, the costs for 
scientists increased and therefore the risk of 
moral hazard too. 
90’s are the period when institutional 
transformations, following the NPM6 discourse, 
                                                                    
5 See the literature on “steady state”, the constraints 
that characterized research policy. (Ziman, 1987; 
Cozzens, 1990).  
6 The New public management, the reform applied to 
the public administrations and civil services during the 
nineties in Europe, is based on a specific type of contract 
between Principal and agent: a relational contract, which 
structure the relation between the contracting parties. 
This is an agreement on the processes and procedures 
more than about specific actions and contents (Milgrom 
and Roberts, 1994). 
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are tried in almost all the European countries. In 
a few words, this reform points to give more 
autonomy and governance capacity to the 
scientific institutions to which scientists are 
subordinated (with a principal-agent relation), 
while policy makers invest in decision making 
in a very general sense; the steering on scientists 
is un-direct. Fixing priorities in research 
programmes is no more the leading way to steer 
scientists. These reform should allow scientific 
institutions to have a more strategic 
management of research priorities and introduce 
an ex-post evaluation (delegated or not to 
scientific institutions) and conditioned funds 
granted to scientific institutions. The 
implementation of the reform is still very 
jeopardised (see Bleiklie, Ferlie, Paradeise, 
Reale, forthcoming), and it leaves room to 
hybrid solutions. 
At the same time there is a revision of the 
Principal-Agent relation, since, even if the State 
is still the main funding institution, there is a cut 
of public resources and a differentiation of 
sources of funding, which allow various 
scholars (Rip and van der Meulen 1996, Brown, 
2003) to elaborate on a multi-principal situation.  
“State is more and more one actor among the 
others” (Brown, 2003, p. 15). 
Finally a different from NPM rationale drives 
another institutional innovation, that of 
promoting network initiatives, where economic 
and social stakeholders are represented and a 
horizontal coordination between different 
(public and private) R/D performers is in place. 
 
Trust and Delegation: type of relationships be-
tween Government and R/D fund beneficiaries. 
 
DEFINITION OF TYPE OF DELEGATION  
BLIND DELEGATION: Policy makers trust the 
scientific community. Scientists establish their 
own peer-review system of control. Scientific 
quality is accepted as a sufficient standard for 
using public money in research. Science is 
trusted to deliver in the medium and long term 
what society needs. 
 
 
INCENTIVE DELEGATION: The incentive model 
comes near to the genuine Principal-Agent 
features: the principal (the policy maker) is 
attempting to formulate priorities that should 
serve as instruction to the agent in the execu-
tion of research. Scientists maintain relatively 
high independence in executing the instruc-
tions. 
AUSTERITY: it identifies a period of public 
budget reduction, which had an impact on R/D 
project funding, producing many sectoral and 
institutional consequences. To differentiate the 
political phenomenon from an economic trend 
we should need evidences on the political 
awareness /choices about funding reduction, 
i.e. aimed at enhancing institutional capabili-
ties to survive and/or concentrating resources 
on specific priorities. In Italy, for instance, 
late ‘80s have been a period of reduction of 
public resources devoted to R/D funding. This 
was due first of all to a negative economic cy-
cle, but Governments did not compensate for 
that and in some cases there was a true politi-
cal choice of pushing public institutions (i.e. 
mainly public non academic research institu-
tions in Italy) towards alternative sources of 
funds (such as private contracts). 
CONTRACT DELEGATION: It is the “relational 
contract” between State and scientific institu-
tions, which structures the relation between 
the contracting parties. It is an agreement on 
the processes and procedures more than about 
specific actions and contents (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1994, p. 206). The New public man-
agement framework has given rise to reflec-
tion on a more efficient use of public money 
and a more effective delivery of public ser-
vice. The principal pays the agent and defines 
in broad terms what she/he wants, while the 
agent promises to use her/his labour power 
and organisation to implement the wishes of 
the principal.  
NETWORK DELEGATION: the State is mostly a 
facilitator; it means that Government wants to 
organise/develop knowledge sharing and thus 
gives the means to research institutions and 
scientists to self organise innovation networks 
with user systems, while it looses pretensions 
of instrumental guidance. 
 
Changes in the evaluation processes go with 
changes in the delegation models, from ex-ante 
to ex-post evaluation, and from peer review to 
more largely elaborated evaluation procedures. 
Different types of delegation modes can coexist 
and consequently they can more or less 
condition the performers’ behaviour and choice. 
The presence of hybrid situation is underlined 
by the literature:  
Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N° 9/2007 
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− science policy makers have to deal with an 
increasing heterogeneity of actors and net-
works, and heterogeneity makes it more diffi-
cult to impose their own goals on the research 
system (Rip and van der Muelen, 1996); 
− the P-A relation is written into institutions and 
policies which together don’t constitute a co-
herent contract; moreover the relation is me-
diated by several institutions (van der Meulen, 
2006); 
− in the application of the delegation relation, 
research funding organizations (funding in-
termediaries) are often able of excluding the 
principal from the contract process (Caswill, 
2003); 
− in specific case, such as research programmes, 
the P-A theory is not able of capturing the 
cumulative and collective consequences of the 
relation it wants to describe. The analysis of 
the “programme in action” should show that 
the long term shaping of research priorities is 
co-produced by the interdependent relations 
between researchers and their funding organi-
zations (Shove, 2003). 
2. METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL 
BACKGROUND 
Studies on S/T policy, especially comparative 
studies, in the past could not be based on suited 
indicators, since official statistics on R/D have 
been traditionally based on performer R/D ex-
penditures, accompanied by the performer based 
indication of the source of fund of R/D expendi-
ture. An important limitation of R&D statistics 
is in fact the lack of categories and classifica-
tions needed for policy analysis7. The present 
paper is an application of new indicators, pro-
duced in a European project8 mainly collected at 
the administrative source of funding9, and con-
cerning the specific instrument of public project 
funding as distinguished from general funds at-
tributed to the public performers for the devel-
                                                                    
7 This is a “structural limitations of the Frascati 
system” (Lepori, 2006a). 
8 Enip Project Funding, PRIME Network of 
Excellence, www.enip-europa.org. 
9 Project funding is distributed by a number of diffe-
rent agencies – intermediaries, ministries, international 
organizations- directly to private and public 
beneficiaries.  
opment of their institutional tasks (Lepori et al., 
2006). Project funding is defined as “money at-
tributed to a group or an individual to perform a 
research activity limited in scope, budget and 
time” (Lepori et al., 2006), distinguished from 
recurrent funding, and it is a central policy cate-
gory, since it is supposed to be an instrument for 
steering public and private R/D activity towards 
policy goals. 
The focus of the paper is on the changes in 
Government policy of resources allocation to 
R/D, taking into account the type of 
relationships between Government and R&D 
fund beneficiaries embedded in the instruments 
and in the selection/evaluation processes of R/D 
projects. As to the funding instruments, while it 
is possible to identify funding instruments 
corresponding to the ideal type of delegation for 
the first two types (Blind and Incentive 
delegation. Institutional reforms (contract 
delegation) is more directly represented through 
procedural changes such as the evaluation 
processes. We analyse changes in funding 
instruments and evaluation processes separately, 
but only their combination give a representation 
of how delegation modes evolved in the various 
countries.  
The central hypotheses to be tested are the 
following: 
Hp 1: The relation between Government and 
fund beneficiaries evolved from a low demand-
ing to a more oriented and monitored one: from 
a “blind delegation” (‘70s) to a period of a clas-
sical incentive-based relation and then, from the 
economic crisis and the “steady state” period, to 
a relational contract, where the focus is on proc-
esses and ex post evaluation, counterbalanced in 
some way by some network delegation mode.  
Hp2: The evaluation processes of Government 
project funding evolved  from an ex-ante selec-
tion process, based on an internal to the benefi-
ciary’s community judgement, towards a double 
(ex-ante and ex-post) evaluation process, where 
external actors are involved, economic impact 
criteria are included and the ex-post evaluation 
has an effect on future Government allocation 
choices. 
 
We regrouped the funding instruments in the 
following categories (type of instruments): 
Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N° 9/2007 
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FREE PROJECTS AND GRANTS: grants attributed 
to individuals and investigator- initiated pro-
jects 
R/D PROGRAMMES: We take into considera-
tion also projects included in large framework, 
where horizontal and/or sectoral priority are 
identified]. The programmes have longer time 
horizon than R/D projects. 
R&D CONTRACTS: they are totally different 
from the “relational contract” between State 
and public institutions, and correspond to 
more practical oriented contracts, where the 
object of research is predefined. Contracts 
have short (1-3 years) time horizon. They are 
mostly contracts for answering to public pro-
curement 
RESEARCH CENTRES, S/T DISTRICTS AND 
PARKS: Funds to Research centres have been 
included within project funding typologies and 
identified with fund to “temporary” R/D infra-
structures.  
 
As to the Processes of selection/evaluation, 
they can be connected with the different types of 
delegation, even if it is not possible to identify a 
full exemplification of delegation ideal type. 
The selection/evaluation processes can be 
described through four types of indicators: 
Who: Composition of the evaluation Committee: 
presence of external members; members from 
abroad; stakeholder representatives. Temporary 
or permanent structure of the evaluation Com-
mittee. 
How:  
a) Methodologies: external peer review; bibli-
ometrics; econometric models; cost/benefit 
analysis; case studies, a mix of instruments; 
b) Criteria: scientific quality; economic impact; 
social impact; internationalisation. 
When: Ex-ante, intermediary, ex-post evaluation 
 
Effects of evaluation on: 
a) funding  
b) priority settings  
 
These qualitative information are often 
available in the legislative/administrative norms 
on which fund is based. Anyway, an 
improvement of the empirical data on content of 
delegation and evaluation procedures was 
developed, with the support of national 
correspondents, in order to analyse the 
processes10. 
3. TYPES OF INSTRUMENTS 
The increase in the volume of the project fund-
ing instrument (PF) is immediately visible if we 
look the PF evolution at constant value (see 
Lepori et al., 2006, Fig. 5). 
Notwithstanding this common trend, 
countries have different evolution: the ratio 
PF/GDP is relatively stable, even if slightly 
growing, in Switzerland, where the instrument is 
largely adopted since the ‘70s; it had a low role 
thirty years ago in Austria and it grew up mostly 
during the 90s, while its growth decelerated at 
the end of the 20th due to the introduction of 
other types of policy instruments (such as funds 
devoted to innovation and infrastructures, which 
cannot be included in R/D project funding). PF 
in Norway started early and had a relevant 
growth during 90s. In Italy the ratio PF/GDP 
grew up since ‘80s and it had an acceleration at 
the beginning of 2000. Italy and Austria started 
later. If we consider the ratio PF/GDP at the end 
of the examined period (2002) Austria and 
Switzerland show a similar value, while Italy 
remain behind them and  Norway show a much 
higher value11.  
Here we examine the evolution of PF by 
instrument and country: in tables and figures 
below the project funding total amount by year 
(1970, 1980, 1990 and 2002) is distributed by 
instrument, regrouped also by type. Figures 1, 2, 
3, and Tables 1, 2 and 3 allow to build and to 
visualize the Government allocation policy in 
terms of instruments and main beneficiaries.  
                                                                    
10 The authors wish to thank Michael Dinges, 
Benedetto Lepori and Stig Sleperseater for their support 
to the paper as to, respectively, Austria, Switzerland and 
Norway. 
11 See Fig. 5, Lepori et al., 2006. 
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Switzerland  
Two main agencies are in charge of the project 
funding allocation in Switzerland: the Swiss Na-
tional Science Foundation (SNF12) for academic 
research, and the Commission for Technology 
and Innovation (CTI) for applied research, a 
commission in the Government Department of 
Economy13. Federal and Cantonal administra-
tions attributed also direct research contracts, 
mainly spot and defence-oriented contracts. PF 
evolution is characterised by an increasing dif-
ferentiation, but the free funding instruments 
still accounts for the largest share of funds. The 
institutional configuration of the system, which 
was built essentially in the ’50 and ’60, re-
mained very stable. The country is characterized 
by a limited role of Government in research pol-
icy and funding, a dominance of the universities, 
a strong self-financed private R&D and a clear 
separation between public and private sector 
(there is no public funding to private R&D). The 
dominance of the universities in PF becomes 
even stronger through time, given the reduction 
of contract funding to private companies in the 
defence sector. 
During 70s National Research Programmes 
are introduced, including practical relevant and 
academic research and where Federal 
Government participated to the selection of 
research team and of programmes, together with 
SNF, but their weight is relatively low (see Tab. 
1). During 90s, Priority Programmes were 
introduced, funding strategic-oriented research, 
they also have a very low weight and are now 
abandoned. National Competence Centres, 
which are large cooperation networks, started in 
2000. 
Project funding in Switzerland underwent 
through two phases of evolution (Lepori, 2006):  
− 1973-1988: the austerity period, when both a 
critical economic period and a transformation 
                                                                    
12 SNF manages mainly the so-called Free research 
projects, which fund research in Universities and support 
Phd students (Lepori, 2006), but since 1970 SNF 
managed also Programmes. 
13 CTI funds small and short time joint projects 
between University and Industry and it is also in charge 
of participation to some international programmes 
(EUREKA). CTI is composed by representatives of 
public administration, public economy, and academia. 
Its relevance grew up with the creation of the 
Universities of Applied Sciences (UAS) in 1990. 
of project funding policy are envisageable. 
“The beginning of ’70 has to be considered a 
watershed in the level of resources available 
to public research system…their rate of 
growth slowed down considerably and be-
came irregular, depending strongly on the 
economic situation” (Lepori, 2005, p. 17). 
The observed evolution is explained by both 
general economic factors and the political 
world’s dissatisfaction with the SNF practices, 
far from orienting research towards socio-
economic problems, such as energy or eco-
nomic crisis. Under these pressures, and the 
risk of a new agency creation, SNF accepted 
managing not directly academic research, 
namely the National Research Programs, and 
doing it jointly with the federal administra-
tion; 
− 1988-2000: an evolution towards more “in-
centive” delegation mode of project funding. 
In 1983 a Research Act “entered into force 
giving explicit competence to Confederation 
for direct support of research and thus allowed 
it to launch new research programs without 
the approval of the Cantons” (Lepori, 2005, p 
17). Project funding was seen as the instru-
ment for implementing political and techno-
logical priorities. Priority-oriented project 
funding didn’t displace pre-existing funding, 
since it was based on “additional” financial 
means, even if small, because the change hap-
pened in a period of slow growth. The result 
was a “moderate differentiation”, while a ma-
jor change was external, i.e. the development 
of the European framework programme and 
the decision of Switzerland to participate to it.  
 
At the end of ‘90s thematic programs lost 
their political importance and SNF redirect part 
of these funds towards more academic 
instruments (Lepori, 2005, p. 18).  
In 1970, free projects were the main 
instruments (60%) and still are in 2002; in 1970 
around 40% of PF concerned  contracts with 
Ministries, mainly defence oriented and space 
contracts, in 1990 and in 2002 they represented  
respectively 47% and 25%, given the decrease 
of Federal Administration contracts devoted to 
military R/D. (Tab. 1). Contracts funding in 
2002 can be reduced to 11% if we don’t include 
the European Space Agency contracts.  
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Programmes (directed fund) represented 
always a relatively less important driver of PF 
allocation policy, even if more important than 
the really marginal network funding. The R/D 
programmes under the incentive scheme were of 
two types: a) small thematic programs on 
specific issue of social or political interests. 
These Programs were limited to 4-5 years with a 
single call at the beginning. Themes were 
decided by the State, but the project selection 
was managed by the scientific intermediary 
body, SNF; b) large thematic programmes with 
a duration of 8-10 years, where again priorities 
were decided by State and selection operated by 
SNF.  
In sum, funding instruments became more 
differentiated going from a combination of free 
projects and Contracts to an introduction of 
Programmes during 70s and more recently of 
Network instruments. In the last available year 
(2002) free projects are still dominant (48%), 
while incentive represents 20% and network 
instrument 7% (Fig. 1).  
 
 
 
FIGURE 1: TYPE OF INSTRUMENTS: SWITZERLAND 
 
 
 
TABLE 1a: TYPE OF INSTRUMENT AS % ON TOTAL PROJECT FUNDING  
SWITZERLAND 
 1970 1980 1990 2002 2002* 
Free projects 60 56 47 48 48 
Programmes 0 6 6 20 4 
Contracts 40 38 47 25 11 
Networks 0 0 0 7 7 
* only national funds 
 
 
If in 2002 we exclude the PF for European 
Framework Programme from the programme 
type and the ESA contract from the contract 
funding type, the R/D fund allocation policy in 
Switzerland is mainly characterised by free 
project funding (Table 1a). 
 
TYPE OF INSTRUMENTS: SWITZERLAND
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Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N° 9/2007 
 
 14 
 
TABLE 1b: TYPE OF PROPJECT FUNDING INSTRUMENT, 
INDEX NUMBER (2000 PRICES, 2002=100) 
SWITZERLAND 
Type of project 
funding instru-
ments 
Name of instru-
ment Years % of total PF
Total amount 
(2000 prices, 
2002=100) 
Main beneficiary 
1970 50 79 
1980 46 77 
1990 36 86 
Free project SNF free re-search projects 
2002 31 100 
Public 
1970 8 54 
1980 6 43 
1990 5 50 
Grant SNF person grants 
2002 7 100 
Public 
1970 2 9 
1980 4 23 
1990 6 45 
Free project CTI collabora-tive projects 
2002 10 100 
Public 
1970 0 0 
1980 6 128 
1990 5 152 
R/D programme 
SNF National 
research pro-
grams 
2002 3 100 
Public 
1970 0 0 
1980 0 0 
1990 0 0 
R/D programme SNF priority programs 
2002 1 100 
Public 
1970 0 0 
1980 0 0 
1990 1 5 
R/D programme EU Framework programs 
2002 16 100 
Public (with a 
significant share 
of private) 
1970 36 153 
1980 27 121 
1990 34 220 
R/D contract 
Federal admini-
stration con-
tracts 
2002 11 100 
Public (with a 
significant share 
of private) 
1970 5 18 
1980 11 40 
1990 13 69 
R/D contract 
European Space 
Agency con-
tracts 
2002 14 100 
Private 
1970 0 0 
1980 0 0 
1990 0 0 
Network of Ex-
cellence 
SNF National 
Centre of Com-
petence in Re-
search 2002 7 100 
Public 
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Austria 
Austria has been historically dominated by 
two research funding institutions: FWF (Aus-
trian Science Fund) e FFF (Industrial Re-
search Promotion Fund) highly independent 
intermediary bodies aimed respectively to 
fund scientific research (the former) and to 
promote industrial research and development 
(the latter)14. They followed a bottom-up ap-
proach: projects were proposed by individual 
actors and selected by an in-house review sys-
tem. Both funds started with small budgets, 
getting more money incrementally over time. 
One of the most important change happened 
in 1970, when the Federal Ministry for Sci-
ence and Research (BMWF) was created. The 
Ministry did not touch the autonomy of the 
two pre-existing Funds, but many top-down 
programmes were designed between seventies 
and eighties, leading over time to a large third 
fund of BMWF Commission and Research15.  
Along the considered years, the incentive 
type instruments (top down programmes) 
grew up, while the weight of the contract 
instrument decreased (Fig. 2 and Tab. 2a). 
 
 The incentive type instruments represented 
around 17% in 1990 and 25% in 2002; the 
network instruments were only recently 
introduced. Contracts lost their relevance over 
time, representing around 23% of total PF in 
1980 and 1990 and around 11% in 2002 (7% 
if we don’t include ESA contracts). 
In sum, Austria went from a 100% free 
research projects to a diversified range of 
instruments where free projects still dominate 
(both for the academy and for the industry), 
but they share place with programmes (25% 
in 2002) and with networks (13%).  
Interestingly enough, in 2002 (the only 
year for which both data are available) the 
weight of the European Framework 
Programmes is 16%, the weight of European 
Space Agency (ESA) contract was 3%. Thus, 
if we exclude these international project 
funding instruments, the predominance of 
free projects still characterises the Austrian 
system (Table 2). 
 
 
FIGURE 2: TYPE OF INSTRUMENTS: AUSTRIA 
                                                                    
14 Both the intermediaries “were created in 1967 ... they were given a strongly autonomous status, i.e. they were 
given governance structure dominated by their beneficiaries than by the Ministries”. (Stampfer, 2005)  
15 In 2004 FFF was merged with three other institutions (Technology Impulse Gesellshaft-TIG, Austrian Space 
Agency-ASA, Bureau for International Research and Technology Co-operation- BIT) into a new innovation funding 
agency (Austrian Research Promotion Agency - FFG). FWF still exists as an autonomous research council. 
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TABLE 2a: TYPE OF INSTRUMENT AS % ON TOTAL PROJECT FUNDING - AUSTRIA 
 1970 1980 1990 2002 2002* 
Free projects 100 77 80 51 51 
Programmes 0 0 17 25 9 
Contracts 0 23 24 11 8 
Networks 0 0 0 13 13 
* only national funds 
TABLE 2b: TYPE OF PROJECT FUNDING INSTRUMENT,  
CURRENT VALUE, THOUSANDS OF EUROS  - AUSTRIA 
Type of project 
funding instru-
ments 
Name of instrument 
Years 1970, 
1980, 1990, 
2002 
Total 
amountin 
current 
1,000 Euro 
% on Total 
Project 
Funding 
Main benefici-
ary: public or 
private 
1970 4,360 48.39% 
1980 11,690 24.67% Total Austrian Science Fund 
1990 33,700 24.82% 
HE 
WKs/DKs 2002 2,790 0.63% HE 
1980 3,190 6.73% 
1990 4,830 3.55% Jubilaumsfonds-Direkt 
2002 12,400 2.82% 
HE 
Print Costs 2002 700 0.15% HE 
ProcurementInt.Coop. 2002 140 0.03% HE 
Scholarship programmes 2002 4,310 0.98% HE 
Lise Meitner 2002 2,120 0.48% HE 
Individual Research Projects 2002 66,790 15.22% HE 
OAW programmes 2002 8,030 1.83% HE 
Erwin Schrodinger Grant 2002 3,610 0.82% HE 
Erwin Schrodinger Return 2002 670 0.15% HE 
Charlotte Buhler 2002 270 0.06% HE 
Factory of the Future  2002 4,240 0.96% Undivided  
AAC OAW 2002 1,350 0.30% HE 
1970 4,650 51.60% 
1980 21,510 45.40% 
1990 42,760 31.50% 
FR
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General Programmes 
2002 118,210 26.95% 
Private  
Take Off 2002 4,900 1.11% Undivided 
A 3 2002 6,440 1.46% Undivided  
Biomed  2002 980 0.22% Undivided  
EnergySystems of the Future 2002 0 0% Undivided 
FP5 Thematic Scheme 2002 71,000 16.18% Undivided  
ITF 2002 3,540 0.80% Private  
FIT-IT 2002 1,610 0.36% Undivided  
GEN-AU 2002 9,610 2.19% HE 
House of the Future 2002 4,590 1.04% Undivided  
IMBA OAW 2002 4,350 0.99% HE 
ISB-Innovatives System Bahan 2002 3,480 0.79% Undivided  
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ITF 1990 22,810 16.80% Private  
1980 10,100 21.32% 
1990 24,160 17.79% Direct contracts 
2002 35,000 7.98% 
Undivided  
1980 880 1.85% 
1990 7,480 5.51% 
R
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ESA 
2002 11,900 2.71% 
Private  
Kind/Knet 2002 12,300 2.80% Private  
CD-Lab 2002 3,800 0.86% Undivided  
SFB 2002 10,240 2.33% HE  
Kplus 2002 24,000 5.47% Undivided  
REGPlus 2002 700 0.15% Private  
R
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FSP 2002 4,200 0.95% HE 
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Italy  
In Italy most of the R&D project funding is un-
der the responsibility of the Ministry for Educa-
tion, University and Research (MIUR). This re-
sponsibility evolved over time. During the ‘70s 
the Minister (MRST) started to manage applied 
research project funding devoted to the private 
beneficiaries, by selecting projects to be submit-
ted to CIPE-Interministerial Committee for the 
Economic Planning. The revised law (L.46/82) 
gave a more explicit commitment to MRST of 
managing the applied research fund. In 1989 the 
law 168/89 transformed MRST in MURST, as 
Ministry in charge of co-ordinating and financ-
ing the overall public and private RDI system.  
CNR (National Research Council) was the 
main intermediary agency, under the MIUR 
control, with a multidisciplinary coverage. It has 
had a double role of research funder and 
performer until 2000. As funder the CNR has 
managed three types of projects: 
− free projects: “contracts and contributes”, 
from 1970 to 1999, which were free grants 
devoted to individual researchers, mainly 
from HE. The difference between the two is 
based on the duration and the content: con-
tributes, in fact, were more limited in time and 
scope than the contracts. In both cases the re-
search themes were selected by the agents, 
and no priorities affected the research design; 
− programmes: the finalised projects (FP) were 
regroupments of projects within scientific 
chosen fields of investigation. The selection 
of the thematic areas and the programme de-
signs were realised by the disciplinary Com-
mittees within CNR. They started from mid 
seventies, were multiyear projects, of practical 
relevant and academic research, based on ad-
ditional and specifically devoted resources 
coming from MIUR. The financing of the se-
lected projects was submitted to the approval 
of the CIPE. Finalised projects lasted five 
years on average, in some cases renewed on 
different five-years cycles (as for energy, 
chemistry and biotechnology). After the CIPE 
approval, CNR was in charge of the selection 
of the applicants (groups of public and in 
some cases also private researchers). 
− strategic projects (PS), started from mid eight-
ies, were multiyear academic-oriented pro-
jects with an explorative character, based on 
an internal-to-CNR research agenda. These 
projects did not represent a significant amount 
of funding (less than 5% of the total PF fund-
ing) so that they were not included in our 
analysis. 
 
Three periods can be outlined for Italy (Fig. 3):  
− from mid seventies to mid eighties there is a 
significant growth of project funding when 
policy makers began to sustain the necessity 
of an integration of research within the na-
tional industrial policy. An effort has been 
done during the ‘80s, with the introduction of 
new instruments mainly devoted to innovation  
(L. 46/82) and partly (National Research Pro-
grammes) based on a priority-setting activity 
of the MURST; 
− from mid eighties to mid nineties: project 
funding suffers a long downward cycle due to 
the public budget constraints. In the same pe-
riod CNR, the scientific intermediary agency, 
starts to reduce its funding allocation role, 
while there is a growing role of Government. 
The funding devoted to the traditional instru-
ment managed by CNR, the Finalized pro-
jects, was cut down and MIUR started to 
transfer upon itself the whole responsibility of 
project funding allocation. In the meantime, 
the public research institutions  were pushed 
towards a diversification of sources of funds; 
− the turning point of the nineties: in this period 
R/D project funding grew up significantly, the 
portfolio diversified, CNR lost totally its role 
of intermediary and Government reinforced 
its role, also with the creation of  special bod-
ies in charge of activities of selection and 
evaluation. 
 
In Italy the allocation policy evolution has 
gone from free projects funding to the 
prevalence of programme or incentive type 
funding. 100% of the project funding 
instruments in 1970 were free projects, with 
public research institutions benefiting of around 
50% of the total PF amount; 70% of the PF 
instruments in 1980 were free projects, with 
public research institutions benefiting of about 
44% of the total PF amount, partly through 
Programmes. Funding through Programmes 
became the prevalent one for public R/D 
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institutions in Italy during the eighties. In 1990, 
free projects concerned only 39% of total PF 
instruments and University received 22% of 
total PF. 
In the last years (2002) a large internal 
differentiation of instruments was in place. 
Contracts (except for ESA) and networks have 
still a very low weight. 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3: TYPE OF INSTRUMENTS: ITALY 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3a: TYPE OF INSTRUMENT AS % ON TOTAL PROJECT FUNDING  
ITALY  
 1970 1980 1990 2002 
Free projects 100 70 39 8 
Programmes 0 30 24 58 
Contracts 0 0 37 (5*) 18 (3.8*) 
Networks 0 0 0 2 
* without ESA contracts 
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TABLE 3b: TYPE OF  PROJECT FUNDING INSTRUMENT 
 CURRENT VALUE, THOUSANDS OF EUROS16  - ITALY 
Type of project fund-
ing instruments Name of instrument 
Years 1970, 
1980, 1990, 
2002 
Total amount
in current 
1000 Euros 
% on Total 
Project 
Funding* 
Main benefi-
ciary: public 
or private 
1990 55,261 7.7% 
PRIN-COFIN 
2002 133,863 7.9% 
Public 
1971 9,684 61.0% 
1980 66,003 55.5% FAR 
1990 182,309 25.3% 
Private 
1971 6,187 39.0% 
1980 17,352 14.6% F
R
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CNR contract and 
contribute 
1990 43,257 6.0% 
Public 
1980 35,417 30.0% 
1990 71,296 9.9% CNR PF 
2002 4,478 0.3% 
Public 
FAR PNR 1990 29,438 4.1% Private 
1990 72,750 10.1% 
FIT 
2002** 165,500 9.8% 
Private 
MAF PF 2002 308,538 18.3% Private 
MIS 2002 72,715 4.3% Public 
FIRB  2002 337,576 20.1% Public 
PON 2002 47,090 2.8% Undivided 
FAR 2002 36,000 2.1% Private 
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FISR 2002 12,520 0.7% Public 
1990 38,000 5.28% 
PON 
2002 63,932 3.8% 
Undivided 
1990 226,494 31.49% 
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ESA 
2002 240,123 14.28% 
Private  
R
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Excellence R/D cen-
tres /FIRB 2002 37,508 2.23% Public 
 
 
European Framework programmes have not been included, since data on national Government contribution are not 
available 
* The sum of the instruments by year can be below 100, since not the whole of the instruments have been 
considered in the table (only the instruments up the 5% of the total PF were included). 
** Since 2001 an important change has been introduced: the fund (FIT) now finances also infrastructures 
(relocation, restructuring and so on of research centres) and at the moment it is only possible to estimate roughly a 
50% for research project and a 50% for infrastructure. So we reduced the 2002 amount by half. 
                                                                    
16 We checked for an estimation of the real transfer of fund to business firms, for the two Funds (FAR and FIT), 
since both FIT and FAR includes repayable loans (low interest loans). The Italian Association for Industrial Research 
(AIRI) has made an estimation of the effective benefit to business firms, i.e. the amount effectively received by 
industrial firms after having deducted refunding. AIRI applied this calculation year by year until 2000 to the public 
out of pocket expenditures, since only there it is possible to do this estimation. The results are the following:  
FIT: it has always had a strong component of repayable loans. AIRI takes into account the weight of this 
component on the total of the Fund, and the recalculation of real benefit on it. It results that on average only 25% of 
the total amount of FIT is the real benefit to industrial firms. Therefore, even if we deal with public appropriation and 
not expenses, we applied this estimation, reducing FIT values by this way. 
FAR: the low interest loans have had a lower weight than in FIT and, always following AIRI, it results that on 
average only 50 % of the total amount of FAR is the real benefit to industrial firms. We applied this estimation and 
reduced FAR values by this way. 
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Norway 
The evolution of R/D funding instruments is 
strongly evident (Fig. 4, Tab. 4). 
R/D funding instruments in Norway 
underwent a relevant change around ‘90s 
when R/D programmes (National priorities 
programmes, Council programmes and 
Government projects) grew up significantly. 
They were allocated partly by Research (sub) 
Councils17 and partly directly by the central 
Government (the largely funded instrument of 
Government projects). In all the cases, 
Government fixed the priorities, and the 
Board of each (sub) Council was composed 
by a mix of researchers and users.  
 In 2000’s other new instruments went to 
joint the R/D Programmes: Targeted 
programmes, Targeted programmes, Strategic 
support programmes and Basic research 
Programmes. 
As to R/D contracts, which are more on 
responsibility of Ministries than on Councils’, 
they don’t represent a relevant instrument and 
have a slight reduction through time. If we 
don’t include international contracts 
(available only for 2002) their weight is 
around 14.6%. 
Networks still don’t characterise the R/D 
funding allocation policy in Norway 
 
 
FIGURE 4: TYPE OF INSTRUMENTS: NORWAY 
 
 
TABLE 4a: TYPE OF INSTRUMENT AS % ON TOTAL PROJECT FUNDING 
 NORWAY  
 1970 1980 1990 2002 
Free projects 74 67 21 12 
Programmes 8 22 70 73 
Contracts 18 11 9 15 
Networks 0 0 0 0 
 
                                                                    
17 With the reform of 1993 the existing five Research Councils were merged in one, with six sub-councils 
organised as mission oriented. The resulting Research Council of Norway had an executive Board with eleven 
government appointed members from broad segment of society, which in turns appointed the members of the six 
research boards. “Norway has departed from the tradition of having one or more university oriented councils”. (see p. 
25, Skoie, 2001, The research councils in Nordic Countries. Developments and some Challenges, Report 10/2001, 
Nordic Council of Ministers). 
TYPE OF INSTRUMENTS: NORWAY
0
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
1970 1980 1990 2002
Free projects 
Programmes 
Contracts 
Networks 
Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N° 9/2007 
 
 
 
 21
 
TABLE 4b: TYPE OF PROJECT FUNDING INSTRUMENT 
CURRENT VALUE, THOUSANDS OF EUROS 
NORWAY 
Type of project 
funding 
Name of instru-
ment Funding agency 
Years*  
1970, 1980, 
1990, 2002 
Total amount
in current 
1000 Euros 
Main benefi-
ciary: public 
or private 
Comments 
1970 13,074 
1980 34,108 Project support 
NAVF 
(Research 
council) 1990 157,100 
Public  
1970 21,073 
1980 176,134 Project support 
NTNF 
(Research 
council) 1990 256,419 
Public  
1973 0,446 
1980 14,389 Project support 
NFFR 
(Research 
council) 1990 14,000 
Public  
1970 10,215 
1980 56,720 Project support 
NLVF 
(Research 
council) 1990 110,408 
Public  
1970 0 
1980 0 Project support 
NORAS 
(Research 
council) 1990 12,555 
 Council esta-blished 1986 
Free projects NFR (Research council) 2002 321,101 Public  
FR
EE
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R
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Projects basic re-
search 
NFR (Research 
council) 2002 59,151 Public  
1970 11,951 
1980 23,365 Individual grants 
NAVF 
(Research 
council) 1990 15,300 
Public  
1970 2,655 
1980 7,589 Individual grants 
NTNF 
(Research 
council) 1990 0 
Public  
1970 1,230 
1980 3,828 Individual grants 
NLVF 
(Research 
council) 1990 36,318 
Public  
1973 0 
1980 1,990 Individual grants 
NFFR 
(Research 
council 1990 10,065 
Public  
 
Individual grants NFR (Research council) 2002 36,786 Public  
1970 0 
1980 0 National priori-ties programmes 
NAVF 
(Research 
council) 1990 122,500 
Public  
1970  
1980 12,433 Council pro-grammes 
NAVF 
(Research 
council) 1990 171,300 
Public  
1970 0 
1980 0 Council pro-grammes 
NTNF 
(Research 
council) 1990 388,000 
Public 
1980: Inclu-
ded in project 
support 
1973 0 
1980 15,300 
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Council pro-
grammes 
NFFR 
(Research 
council) 1990 109,829 
Public  
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1970 0 
1980 0 
Council pro-
grammes 
NORAS 
(Research 
council) 
1990 104,975 
 Council esta-blished 1986 
Programmes ba-
sic research 
NFR (Research 
council) 2002 170,705 Public  
Strategic support NFR (Research council) 2002 251,722 Public  
Large program-
mes 
NFR (Research 
council) 2002 100,135 Public  
Targeted pro-
grammes 
NFR (Research 
council) 2002 671,167 Public  
1970 6,533 
1980 74,010 
1990 1177,243 
Government pro-
jects 
Central go-
vernment 
2002 1427,557 
Public  
1970 11,819 
1980  Industrial con-tracts 
NTNF 
(Research 
council) 1990 254,400 
Private  
1970 2,435 
1980 47,428 Innovation con-tracts 
NTNF 
(Research 
council) 1990 0 
Private  
1970 0 
1980 0 Innovation con-tracts 
NLVF 
(Research 
council) 1990 14,300 
Private  
International pro-
jects 
NFR (Research 
council) 2002 24,761 Public  
Innovation con-
tracts 
NFR (Research 
council) 2002 526,101 Private  
1970 2,895 
1980 3,700 
1990 102,549 
R
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Government In-
novation con-
tracts 
Industrial fund 
2002 0 
Private  
Networks 
Not present in 
the years taken 
into considera-
tion 
    
 
 
 
 
4. PROCESSES OF 
SELECTION/EVALUATION 
The changes of modes of delegation in science 
policy (from a blind delegation to the emergence 
of new modes linked to contracts and networks, 
which co-exist with the old ones) are supposed 
to produce effects on the costs of policy making. 
Braun (2003) underlines that the blind delega-
tion allows a complete abstention of policy 
makers from any action able to influence the 
science functioning. This implies that no costs 
for monitoring and evaluation purposes should 
be paid by the State as principal, as no problem 
of moral hazard and control of scientific respon-
siveness could arise. The new mechanism of 
delegation based on incentives modified the re-
lationship between the principal and the agents, 
because the policy makers had new costs for 
priority setting, for peer reviewing organisation 
and for designing and funding the programs. 
The principal introduced monitoring procedures 
and measurements of the research outputs in or-
der to gain information on the agents’ activities, 
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but incentives remained almost ineffective in 
order to address the scientists’ efforts towards 
the pursuing of the objective selected as relevant 
by policy makers, because they were operated 
by “adding program funding to the already ex-
isting global … funding”, while scientists main-
tained “high independence in executing the 
principal instructions” (Braun, 2003). In both 
cases (blind and incentive delegation) the rela-
tionship is between the State, or intermediary 
bodies, as principal, and the scientists, as actors. 
The delegation by contracts is seen as a real 
turning point, since contracts become an 
“indirect way or steering the behaviour of 
scientists … and to increase the social 
responsiveness of scientists”. Contracts are 
addressed to institutions, not to scientists and 
institutions themselves control scientists’ 
behaviour; thus a sort of ‘nested delegation’ is 
created, helping to avoid moral hazards. The 
emergent NPM paradigm, which shaped during 
the eighties and the nineties the relationships 
between the principal and the agents, allowed 
policy makers to overcome the problem of 
“incomplete contracts” by guaranteeing a large 
space of manoeuvre to the agents for selecting 
the actions to put in place, while the policy 
makers use of precise guidelines as mean to 
constraint the institutions’ choices. Thus, the 
definition of priorities evolved toward the 
fixation of general objectives, which can be used 
as parameters for the principal’s control. This 
new scheme implies not only an investment on 
decision making (for setting instruments and 
political guidelines) such as in the case of 
incentive delegation, but also high cost for 
monitoring and evaluation processes, as well as 
for continuous reporting from institutions. The 
expected consequence for project funding would 
be the reinforcement of the ex-ante evaluation 
processes, and the setting up of strong in-itinere 
and ex-post assessments, whose results are 
supposed to influence the resource allocation.  
In the Network model decisions are delegated 
to the network and monitoring activities 
reduced, because of the “difficulty in defining 
adequate measures”. The principal acts only as a 
facilitator, helping institutions to co-ordinate 
themselves (Braun, 2003). 
Tables 5 and 6 show the test of the hypothesis 
2 for Switzerland and Italy, for each type of 
instrument. The expected consequences would 
be the reinforcement of the ex ante evaluation 
processes (in terms of composition of the 
evaluation committees and the setting of 
permanent evaluation structures), and a 
diversification of criteria and methodology 
(from criteria mainly focused on scientific 
quality, to a mix of criteria including economic 
and social impact as well as internationalisation; 
from external peer review to a mix of 
instruments including tools such as 
bibliometrics, econometrics, cost-benefit 
analysis). In sum, evaluation is supposed to 
follow the general evolution of research 
governance predicted by the Braun’s 
assumptions on the shift in delegation modes. 
Because of the lack of direct information on 
selection/evaluation processes of each funding 
instrument in Austria, this country has been 
discussed on the basis of administrative sources 
(mainly political documents and specific 
surveys), which generally are more focused on 
the overall selection/evaluation processes 
applied by managing agency, than on the 
specificities of the single instrument. 
Switzerland 
In Switzerland, SNF instruments present differ-
ences between free projects and grants on the 
one side, and national research programs and 
priority programs, on the other.  
Free projects started from the fifties and have 
been evaluated, with no major changes, by a 
permanent committee composed by academics 
(mostly international) as a peer review, without 
quantitative criteria and ranking. Criteria 
referred to scientific quality of the proposal and 
reputation of the proponent, and no other 
assessment follow after decision for individual 
projects. No major effects can be observed over 
time, apart from a self-reinforcing effect on 
applicants which succeeded, based on 
reputation. This scheme applied in the same way 
to the SNF personnel grants to doctoral students, 
advanced researchers and assistant professors, 
which emerged in the seventies. 
National research programs and priority 
programs were established the former from mid 
seventies, and the latter from 1992. Research 
programs were conceived as targeted to socio-
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political needs, while priority programs were 
aimed to promote key technologies for the 
economic development. The implementation of 
both funding instruments was characterised by a 
significant academic-oriented activity with a 
large component of basic research. The 
selection/evaluation processes were basically the 
same: temporary structure of the Committees; 
each program, within the instrument, had its 
own committee. The composition was mixed: 
both academics and experts from the private 
sector were involved. Methodology was 
essentially a peer review based on international 
experts; criteria focused on scientific quality and 
the relevance of the proposal for the theme of 
the program and for policy (as to research 
programs) or for economic development (as to 
priority programs). The time of the evaluation 
was limited to the ex ante phase, but the whole 
instruments have been repeatedly assessed. No 
major effects (see Tab. 4) are present so as in 
the case of free projects and grants.  
A recent instrument managed by SNF was the 
Centre of competence, settled in 2000, aimed to 
fund cooperative networks between national 
universities and doctoral schools in specific 
domains. The selection process was two steps: 
first the qualitative selection made by a 
permanent Committee composed by academics, 
based on peer review by external mostly 
international experts. Scientific quality was the 
main criteria. The second step was the 
transmission of a short list of proposal to the 
Government for the final selection, which was 
based on research policy considerations, 
Intermediary evaluation is applied after the first 
four-years period and it is linked to the decision 
of funding the second four-years period. 
In the case of the university-industry 
cooperation projects, managed by the Swiss 
Innovation Agency (CTI), innovation and 
potential economic exploitation are the criteria 
used by the internal evaluation committee, 
which sometimes used external experts. The 
committee included mixed competences: from 
academia, from the State, from the private 
sector, with the State playing a strong role. No 
intermediary or ex-post evaluation was applied. 
As to the Federal contracts, the officer itself 
generally selected them, on the basis of internal 
evaluation based on the relevance for policy 
making. Both instruments did not show any kind 
of evolution of the selection evaluation 
processes. 
If we look at the SNF PF portfolio, we can 
see that, on the one hand, academic oriented 
instruments were partly characterised by 
selection/evaluation processes, which largely fit 
with the Braun’s blind delegation mode, while 
the new instrument of national Centre of 
competence seems more close to the network 
mode of delegation. On the other hand, thematic 
PF (SNF research programs and priority 
programs) tried to adopt a more applied-oriented 
assessment through the enlarged composition of 
the evaluation Committee, including non-
academic members, and criteria, which went 
beyond the scientific quality. In these cases 
elements of an incentive mode of delegation are 
evident. 
Moreover, the selection/evaluation processes 
of SNF instruments, which seem more linked to 
blind and incentive delegation modes, although 
introduced in different periods, maintained the 
same schemes, while only the very new 
instrument (centre of competence) showed a 
different rather innovative selection process. 
This fact confirms the presence of strong path 
dependency in the way in which SNF tended to 
shape the instruments.  
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TABLE 5: EVALUATION MODES - SWITZERLAND 
Type of in-
strument 
Who: give the 
composition 
of the evalua-
tion Commit-
tee by mem-
ber type 
Temporary 
or perma-
nent struc-
ture of the 
Committee 
How: meth-
odology by 
type 
How: criteria 
by type 
When: interme-
diary, ex post 
Effects: only 
the effect 
with affirma-
tive answer 
Years* 
SNF free 
projects 
Academic 
only Permanent 
Peer review 
by external 
experts 
Scientific 
quality 
No evaluation 
after decision 
for individual 
projects 
Project re-
sults relevant 
for new ap-
plications 
based on 
reputation) 
1952- 
SNF grants Academic only Permanent 
Peer review 
by external 
experts 
Scientific 
quality 
No evaluation 
after decision 
for individual 
projects 
Project re-
sults relevant 
for new ap-
plications 
based on 
reputation) 
At 
least 
from 
the ’70 
SNF national 
research pro-
grams 
Mixed (aca-
demic + state) 
Temporary: 
each pro-
gram has its 
own com-
mittee 
Peer review 
by external 
experts 
Scientific 
quality; rele-
vance to the 
theme of the 
program and 
for policy 
No evaluation 
after decision 
for individual 
project. The 
whole instru-
ment has been 
repeatedly 
evaluated. 
Project re-
sults relevant 
for new ap-
plications 
based on 
reputation) 
1975- 
SNF priority 
programs 
Mixed (aca-
demic + econ-
omy) 
Temporary: 
each pro-
gram has its 
own com-
mittee 
Peer review 
by external 
experts 
Scientific 
quality; rele-
vance to the 
theme of the 
program and 
for economic 
development 
No evaluation 
after decision 
for individual 
project. The 
whole instru-
ment has been 
repeatedly 
evaluated. 
Project re-
sults relevant 
for new ap-
plications 
based on 
reputation) 
1992-
2002 
SNF national 
centres of 
competence 
Academic 
only for the 
evaluation. 
Final decision 
by the minis-
try on a short 
list from the 
SNF). 
Permanent 
Peer review 
by external 
experts 
Scientific 
quality 
Intermediary 
evaluation after 
4-years period 
Decision of 
funding of 
the second 
phase (4+4) 
2000- 
CTI projects 
Council with 
a mixed com-
position (aca-
demics, pri-
vate econ-
omy, state). 
State influ-
ence is well 
present. 
Permanent 
Evaluation 
by commit-
tee mem-
bers, some-
times with 
support 
from exter-
nal experts 
Innovation 
and eco-
nomic poten-
tial of the 
projects 
No evaluation 
after decision 
for individual 
projects 
Project re-
sults relevant 
for new ap-
plications 
based on 
reputation) 
1944- 
Federal ad-
ministration 
contracts 
Generally the 
officer itself 
(sometimes 
program com-
mittee) 
NA 
Sometimes 
support by 
external ex-
pert, nor-
mally inter-
nal evalua-
tion 
Relevance 
for policy-
making is 
normally the 
main crite-
rion 
Normally no 
evaluation (non 
compliance to 
the contracts is 
very rare). 
Project re-
sults relevant 
for new ap-
plications 
based on 
reputation) 
 
*Years are referred both to the type of instrument and to the type of evaluation model. If the same instrument went 
into a new evaluation typology it is possible to write it more than one time. 
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Austria 
Austria PF was managed mainly by FFF (Aus-
trian Industrial Research Promotion Fund) and 
FWF (Austrian Science Fund), established as 
main funding agencies since the sixties, while in 
late eighties TIG was created for the Compe-
tence centres programme, which bring together 
industrial consortia and academic research for a 
seven-year period. In 2004 TIG and FFF, with 
other funding agencies, were merged into the 
FGF, a new integrated intermediary body in 
charge for funding innovation and industrial re-
search, while FWF remained stable, supporting 
academic basic research in all fields of science 
through a different set of instruments. Moreover, 
three ministries share the policy responsibilities 
for PF: the Ministry for Education, Science and 
Culture (BMBVK), which plays a prominent 
role, the Ministry for Transport, Infrastructure 
and Technology (BMVIT) and the Ministry for 
Economy and Labour (BMWA). All the Minis-
tries also managed PF instruments by them-
selves. 
The systematic use of evaluation of PFs in 
Austria was substantially improved from mid 
nineties18, although internal to agencies 
evaluation capabilities were not yet present 
(Jorg, 2004). A survey developed in 2000s on 
110 measures developed by the Ministries, 
showed that 30 PFs were evaluated in the last 
seven years. The focus of the exercises was 
mainly on economic and scientific impact (73% 
of conducted evaluations), while processes, 
management and quality of work have lower 
rates (about 30% of cases). As to the use of 
evaluations, most of all have a “legitimating 
function” (90%), while only 30% of conducted 
evaluations were used for re-allocating funds or 
for introducing substantial change of funding 
policy. These results demonstrate that 
evaluation, although strongly implemented, did 
not yet enter the decisional processes driving 
policy choices and funding allocation (Jorg, 
2004). 
As to the FFF, it funded projects generally 
aimed to create new or improved products 
(54%) or processes (27%). The role performed 
                                                                    
18 The establishment of the Platform Research 
Technology Policy Evaluation is a proof of a new role of 
evaluation, supposed to become a “learning instrument 
within the policy making process” (Jorg, 2004). 
by the agency was that of funding bottom up 
proposal of companies. FFF (and FWF too) 
underwent an evaluation process, which 
included also the way in which the agency 
assesses its project portfolio from 1992 to 2002 
(Arnold, 2004). The procedure addressed the 
technological quality of the projects, of 
submitting firm, the economic value of the 
project and the economic and managerial 
performance of the company. Each project was 
assessed by the Agency with the support of 
external experts. Reporter’s suggestions to the 
agency include, among others, the need to adopt 
new project evaluation and selection procedures 
adapted to overcome the fragmentation of the 
current programmes and to introduce a more 
pro-active and stronger programme 
management. 
In FWF funding decisions are based on peer 
reviewing with the involvement of external, 
mostly international experts. The evaluation of 
FWF funding activities (Arnold, 2004) outlined 
that the review criteria traditionally have been 
scientific quality of the project and of the 
research team, and appropriateness of the 
budget. In 2003 new criteria were added 
(implication of the project for other branches of 
science, potential socio-economic impact), but 
they did not play a significant role. Moreover, 
the judgements of external reviewers in some 
cases were decisive, while in others were 
considered only as advice. In recent years, 
efforts on evaluation increased and intermediate 
and ex post assessment exercises were 
developed for the Networks programme. FWF 
adopted the standards elaborated by the Austrian 
Platform for Evaluation of Research and 
Technology for the assessment practices. 
In sum, policy documents describe for Austria 
a mixed situation as to FFF and FWF. Both have 
for a long time stable practices, which seem 
respectively more linked to incentive mode of 
delegation, the former, and blind delegation, the 
latter. The government push toward a more 
effective role of evaluation procedures produced 
effects only in late nineties, reinforcing the 
attention toward priority setting, efficiency and 
effectiveness of results for FFF funding 
instruments, and toward qualitative standards for 
FWF funds. Networks, which are the novelty in 
FWF’s schemes, included intermediary and ex 
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post evaluation. Incentive and blind modes still 
coexist, and network emerged as new delegation 
scheme. The emphasis given to standards in 
evaluation practices is a signal of a tendency 
toward introducing the managerial paradigm in 
the State-scientists relationships. 
Italy 
Italy showed minor changes in selec-
tion/evaluation processes of funding instruments 
although many of them were reformed during 
the nineties. 
COFIN, a PF instrument devoted to 
universities, shifted from a system based on 
experts’ review to a formally structured peer 
review system. Moreover, the success rate of 
applicants entered in the funding formula of the 
university. No other modifications can be 
outlined: evaluation committees are temporary 
and composed only by academics, no 
intermediary or ex post evaluation was 
implemented and the selection remained based on 
scientific quality of the project proposal and of 
the project leader. The other historical academic-
oriented project funding –contracts and 
contributes of CNR- did not underwent any 
evolution. On the contrary, they remained stable 
along 30 years with the selection made by the 
CNR disciplinary committees on the basis of 
scientific quality. Surprisingly enough, in mid 
seventies CNR launched the Finalized projects as 
funding instruments of programs linked to themes 
interesting the socio-economic development. 
Although Finalized projects were supposed to be 
more policy-oriented than contracts and 
contributes, the selection processes were 
organised more or less in the same way.  
CNR funding instruments ended in 1999, and 
were replaced by two new schemes managed by 
the Ministry of University and research. One is 
FIRB for oriented and non-oriented basic 
research; the other was a thematic-oriented 
instrument, FISR, devoted to fund projects 
dealing with research priorities identified by the 
Government. Both selection/evaluation processes 
were driven by temporary committees, with a mix 
composition (academics plus representatives of 
the economic sector). The Committees adopted a 
peer review methodology, using criteria, which 
included the relevance to the theme of the 
program and scientific quality. In sum, there 
was a passage from criteria based on scientific 
quality to a more diversified set of criteria, 
according to the supposed cogent characteristics 
of the instruments. We note, on the one hand, 
the opening to external experts of the peer 
committees in charge for evaluation, in order to 
acquire reviews from specialised scholars, thus 
assuring more precise and independent 
judgements. On the other hand, the enlargement 
of instruments did not go with the 
implementation of ex-post evaluation 
As to the innovation-oriented funding 
instruments (FAR and FIT) they had more or less 
the same selection/evaluation processes until 
1999: mixed and temporary committee, internal 
evaluation, no assessment after decisions on 
individual projects. After 1999, FAR was 
reformed while FIT remained stable. No major 
changes are really visible for evaluation in both 
cases, except for the inclusion in FAR of a formal 
peer review system for the selection of proposals. 
The reform foreseen by law remained largely 
ineffective. Lastly, the PON instrument was 
created in order to integrate the EU Structural 
Funds with other national funding for regions 
characterised by a low economic development. In 
this case the main differences with the other 
innovation instruments do not lay in the selection 
process, but in the presence of intermediary and 
final evaluation on the compliance of objectives 
established in the contract. 
Although modifications occurred in the Italian 
PF instruments, no significant shift emerged in 
evaluation processes. Free projects and grants, 
which seemed more linked to a blind delegation, 
have been substantially reduced, and were 
replaced by schemes, which integrated aspects of 
an incentive mode of delegation (mostly priority 
setting). Peer review with the participation of 
external, mostly international, experts was widely 
introduced, and efforts have been done to push 
the agents toward pursuing the principal research 
aims, by introducing criteria which made 
reference to the relevance of the proposal for 
policy making. Contract mode of delegation did 
not concretely emerged in the nineties reforms, 
as it was not practically implemented. Basically 
the PF selection/evaluation processes developed 
along paths, which largely maintained the 
existing characteristics.  
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TABLE 6: EVALUATION MODES 
ITALY 
Type of 
instrument 
Who: give the 
composition 
of the evalua-
tion Commit-
tee by member 
type 
Temporary or 
permanent 
structure of 
the Commit-
tee 
How: methodology by 
type 
How: criteria by 
type 
When: intermedi-
ary, ex post 
Effects: only the 
effect with af-
firmative answer 
Years* 
PRIN 
COFIN 
Academic 
only Temporary Review by experts Scientific quality 
No evaluation 
after decision for 
individual projects 
None 1982-1996 
PRIN 
COFIN 
Academic 
only Temporary 
Peer review by ex-
ternal experts Scientific quality 
No evaluation 
after decision for 
individual projects 
Project results 
relevant for 
funding alloca-
tion to the insti-
tutions 
1997-
2002 
FAR 
Mixed (aca-
demic + 
economy) 
Temporary 
Evaluation by com-
mittee members, 
sometimes with sup-
port from external 
experts, from sur-
veys and site visits 
Innovation and 
economic poten-
tial of the projects 
Intermediary 
Possibility to 
stop the project 
funding 
1968-
1999 
FAR  
Mixed (aca-
demic + 
economy) 
Temporary 
Evaluation by com-
mittee members, 
with support from 
external experts 
Innovation and 
economic poten-
tial of the projects 
Intermediary fore-
seen by law 
Possibility to 
stop the project 
funding 
1999-
2002 
FAR 
PNR 
Mixed (aca-
demic + 
economy) 
Temporary Evaluation by com-mittee members 
Relevance to the 
theme of the pro-
gram, relevance of 
the public-private 
partnership  
No evaluation 
after decision for 
individual projects 
NA 1990-2000 
CNR 
Contracts 
and con-
tribute 
Academic 
only Permanent 
Evaluation by com-
mittee members Scientific quality° 
No evaluation 
after decision for 
individual projects 
NA 1968-1999 
CNR PF Academic only Permanent 
Evaluation by com-
mittee members 
Scientific quality 
Relevance to the 
theme of the pro-
gram 
No evaluation 
after decision for 
individual projects 
NA 1975-2002 
FIT 
Mixed (aca-
demic + 
economy) 
Temporary Evaluation by com-mittee members 
Relevance to the 
theme of the pro-
gram 
No evaluation 
after decision for 
individual projects 
NA 1982-2002 
l.64/1986 
Mixed (aca-
demic + 
economy) 
Temporary 
Evaluation by com-
mittee members, 
with support from 
external experts 
Scientific quality 
No evaluation 
after decision for 
individual projects 
NA  
PON 
Mixed (aca-
demic + 
economy) 
Temporary 
Evaluation by com-
mittee members, 
with support from 
external experts 
Relevance for 
policymaking and 
scientific quality 
Intermediary and 
Final 
Possibility to 
stop the project 
funding 
2002 
FIRB^ 
Mixed (aca-
demic + 
economy) 
Temporary Peer review by ex-ternal experts 
Scientific quality, 
Relevance to the 
theme of the pro-
gram 
Final foreseen by 
law, Intermediary 
recommended by 
the Evaluation 
Committee 
Possibility fore-
seen by law to 
stop the project 
funding 
2002 
FISR 
Mixed (aca-
demic + 
economy) 
Temporary Peer review by ex-ternal experts 
Relevance to the 
theme of the pro-
gram, Scientific 
quality, economic 
potential of the 
projects 
No evaluation 
after decision for 
individual projects 
Possibility fore-
seen by law to 
stop the project 
funding 
1999 
* Years are referred both to the type of instrument and to the type of evaluation model. If the same instrument went into a new 
evaluation typology it is possible to write it more than one time. 
° Scientific quality of both the project proposal and the project leader 
^ Excellence centres and R&D centres also included 
NA=negative answer 
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Norway 
 
Before 1993, selection and evaluation processes 
of the three mission-oriented councils were 
mostly organised according to scientific disci-
plines, Sub-committees were in charge of fund-
ing decisions for each area. The committees had 
a mixed composition (members from academia, 
industry, public institutions and government), 
which was decided partly in order to represent 
stakeholders’ interests and partly in order to 
have scientific competences (individual merit). 
The committees were also relatively free to de-
fine their own evaluation procedures, and the 
extent of use of external referees was different 
between disciplines and councils. Selection cri-
teria were scientific excellence for NAVF (the 
research council devoted to academic research), 
while the other Councils applied partly scientific 
and partly industrial or economic relevance.  
Since the establishment of the Research 
Council for Norway (NFR) in 1993, the 
evaluation procedures have become more 
streamlined, as use of international peer reviews 
and scientific merit as selection criteria have 
become widespread. For innovation-oriented 
instruments and projects dedicated to political 
problems, relevance criteria seems to have 
played a larger role in some areas. 
For instruments directly funded by 
government, relevance has been more 
significant, than for most of the funding 
allocated by research councils. Government 
officials have been in charge for decisions, often 
in close collaboration with the researchers 
performing the projects. 
Although information on Norway cannot be 
referred to the single funding instrument, it 
seems quite clear that the selection/evaluation 
processes of the Councils remained stable along 
the considered period, adopting mainly a blind 
mode of delegation, which was challenged in 
mid nineties by the will to give more room to 
criteria which refer to political priority setting or 
to economic added value. Anyway these 
changes did not seem so deep and the overall 
system just added an incentive mode of 
delegation to the blind one. Nor contract relation 
mode neither network mode can be detected. 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The study of the R/D funding policy and of its 
change needs data on the fund side and it finds 
an important instrument of measurement in pro-
ject funding data, that represents 100% of the 
direct funding devoted to private beneficiaries, 
and a growing share of the R/D funds of aca-
demic and R/D public institutions.  
Some scholar found out that the rationale of 
public R/D funding allocation went from one 
based on a linear process to a national system of 
innovation based rationale. On this view, the 
more relevant turning point as to the purposes 
and means of allocating public funds to S/T 
research came during the ‘90s and was 
characterised by the discourses on “national 
economic competitiveness” and responsibility of 
public fund managers towards the electorate 
(David, 1998). From another point of view 
(Braun, 2003), that we followed in our analysis, 
‘90s was a period of transition from a direct 
steering (the attempt of the State as principle to 
have the scientific community working towards 
some goals) to a  more indirect steering, where a  
“relational” contract and a “new public 
management” orientation should allow a  
deployment of  the State power of control on 
scientific institutions. Network delegation can 
be seen (see Braun, 2003) as a counterbalance of 
the scientific community steering, where 
heterogeneous, bottom up or multilevel, types of 
control and coordination can coexist, while State 
is a facilitator of cooperation and trust building. 
Starting from this theoretical background, our 
paper wanted to answer the question: which 
patterns of delegation can be detected by 
integrating quantitative indicators on 
Government PF with qualitative information on 
the processes of selection and evaluation of the 
funding instruments.  
We tested the hypothesis that, along the thirty 
year period considered by the analysis, the 
relevance of the Government R/D project 
funding grew up in accordance with the changes 
in the delegation mode and the evaluation 
processes were generally reinforced and 
extended, including strong ex-post controls. The 
empirical test of these hypothesis showed that 
there is a risk of oversimplification. We looked 
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only to four countries (where data are available), 
but we got enough evidence that the transition 
among delegation modes was not so linear, 
neither an homogeneous process.  
In Switzerland some pressure for funds to 
innovation and thematic policy appeared, but as 
data show, the funding policy concerned mainly 
the participation to the European R/D 
Framework Programme. As to national R/D 
fund, the weight of free projects remained 
dominant and the historical scientific 
intermediary (SNF) didn’t loose its role in 
allocation policy. Evaluation practices followed 
the evolution of the two types of delegation, 
blind and incentives, being different one from 
the other, but without other changes over time. 
No push toward the settlement of stringent ex-
post evaluation practices was present. Periodical 
evaluations of the instruments as a whole seem 
to have been the mean for implementing R/D 
funding. R/D networks are the emerging new 
funding instruments (13% in 2002), with an 
evaluation practice near to the network 
delegation mode.  
The Austria PF system was characterised by 
the prominent role of two funding 
intermediaries, one devoted to scientific (FWF) 
and the other to applied (FFF) research; they 
shared the basic feature of a large autonomy 
(room of manoeuvre), but the evaluation 
processes were targeted, respectively on blind 
and on incentive delegation mode. The FWF 
adopted scientific quality criteria as main 
criteria of evaluation, while within FFF the 
Committee was not discipline oriented and new 
criteria of socio economic impact were adopted. 
A certain stability of funding allocation policy 
was assured by the capability of the 
intermediaries to succeed in their role of 
mediating between the principal and both public 
and private beneficiaries. Government choice 
was to add new intermediary bodies, managing 
new PF instruments, instead of replacing the 
existing ones. Among incentive and blind 
funding modes any way the first one result to be 
more relevant in terms of national resources 
allocated, while recently (2000s) is emerging the 
funding of a new instrument, the R/D network 
(13% on total PF), which include new 
(intermediary and ex post) evaluation processes.  
Moreover in Austria the emphasis given since 
mid ‘90s to standards in evaluation practices is a 
signal of a tendency toward the introduction of 
the “managerial paradigm” within the State-
scientists relationships19 even if at present 
evaluation practices have an impact only in 
terms of improving future programmes 
management.  
In Italy, project funding was mainly an 
instrument to fund private R/D and went from a 
coexistence of free projects/grants and R/D 
programmes  (‘80s are characterised as such) to 
a progressive reduction of the formers in favour 
of a more pronounced incentive type R/D 
funding, both towards private and academic 
beneficiaries. Free projects and R/D 
programmes (whose forerunners were in mid 
‘70s CNR scientific finalised projects) followed 
different evaluation processes, respectively 
blind and incentive delegation oriented. But 
over time Italy does not show an evolution of 
evaluation practices going towards the 
“relational” contract delegation mode; funding 
evaluation do not still affect fund allocation or 
priority settings. 
In Norway before ’93 R/D funding policy 
was mainly characterized by trust oriented 
processes of selection/evaluation, while after ’93 
targeted R/D programmes were strongly 
implemented, the Committees of the sub 
councils are organised by application areas and 
have a mixed composition. Other types of 
evolution concerning project funding are not 
visible. R/D networks funding is still not 
emerging neither a new evolution within PF 
selection/evaluation practices (such as ex post 
evaluation).   
Our empirical evidences do not seem to 
confirm the hypotheses we intended to test. 
Evaluation processes at present show a change 
in the evaluation Committees’ composition, in 
the criteria and methodology of selection, aimed 
to reinforce the adjustment of scientists to 
priorities, but these new practices often remain 
                                                                    
19 Two recent events go in that direction namely: the 
new University Act of 2002, introducing autonomy for 
University and the steps toward the establishment of a 
system of ex-ante and ex-post evaluation, such as the 
definition of a catalogue of criteria and guidelines for 
the  impact analysis of R/D funding, in July 2002. 
Moreover, we can mention the merging of FFF and other 
intermediary bodies managing PF instruments for 
innovation into the new FGF. 
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ineffective. The new evaluation practices in 
most case don’t have any effect on fund 
allocation policy, then the ambiguity between 
given external priorities and scientists’ freedom, 
with risk of moral hazard and with high costs on 
both sides (State and scientific community) has 
not been solved. On average free projects 
correspond to a blind delegation type 
(instrument and evaluation processes), while 
R/D programmes correspond to the incentive 
delegation type; the quantitative analysis 
allowed us to find out that the change towards 
an R/D incentive funding policy (R/D 
programme) at national level of resource 
allocation, was not always so strong and did not 
replace the trust oriented instruments 
(Switzerland and Austria).  
The funding of R/D networks seem to be the 
emerging phenomena, although in comparison 
with the political discourses on R/D networks 
and collaborations (often in a national system of 
innovation style) the reality is still small sized.  
Changes in the selection and evaluation 
processes going towards a more “contract” 
delegation model (or New public management 
regime), which should have to solve the paradox 
between welfare objectives and scientific 
freedom, are very poor: only in Austria we 
found out some signs of change.  
Certainly our evidences should have to be 
controlled through other case studies, but as a 
first result it comes out that Government project 
funding seems to be a weak instrument for 
steering the scientific community.  
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